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Abstract 
This article studies how the composition of public revenues in terms of sources (such as 
taxation, social insurance contributions, mineral rents, foreign aid) is associated with different 
welfare regimes and social policy outcomes. It is divided into two halves: a review of 
literature and research, and a cross-national data analysis. The first half reviews literature on 
the emergence of tax and revenue systems in the West and on the relevance of these 
frameworks and findings to developing countries. The second half uses cluster analysis to 
identify groups of developing countries with contrasting revenue systems in 2000, and then 
compares these with our previous analysis of welfare regimes in the Global South. We 
conclude that higher tax or revenue levels are not associated with more advanced or effective 
welfare systems. It is only the scope of social security contributions that correlates with proto-
welfare states in the developing world. 
 
 
Introduction 
This article studies how the composition of public revenues in terms of sources (such as 
taxation, social insurance contributions, mineral rents, foreign aid) is associated with different 
welfare regimes and social policy outcomes. It is divided into two halves: the development of 
a model of the determinants of welfare and revenue systems, and a cross-national data 
analysis to test the model. 
The first half applies an earlier conceptual model to explain the development of social 
policies and welfare states in the „West‟, in particular Europe, in terms of the „5 I‟s‟: 
industrialisation, interests, institutions, ideas, and the international environment. The strengths 
and weaknesses of the model are then considered when applied to the very different terrain of 
the developing world. In this article, we further apply the model to the emergence of fiscal 
systems of taxation and state revenues – again identifying parallels and differences in the 
  
3 
ability of this framework to explain fiscal systems in the South compared with the North. It is 
not our intention to provide a systematic review of the factors affecting state revenue 
structures, which would require a much longer article. Rather, we consider the effectiveness 
of the extant „5 I‟s‟ model to shed light on cross-national patterns in welfare and fiscal 
systems. 
In the second part, we turn to quantitative cross-national evidence. We summarise our 
earlier analysis of welfare regimes in developing countries and then go on to apply the data to 
state revenue sources. In both cases, we use cluster analysis based on data for 2000. Finally, 
we present our findings on the relationship between welfare regimes and state revenue 
structures. The conclusion asks: Is there a relationship between specific revenue structures, 
regime types and welfare outcomes across the global South? It also adds qualifications and 
cautions about interpreting this type of analysis. 
 
The determinants of welfare and revenue systems 
Gough (2008) reviewed theories of Western welfare states and considered their relevance or 
otherwise for understanding social policies in the developing world (see also Gough & 
Therborn, 2010). There is a long history of case studies and comparative research into social 
programmes across the OECD world which can be drawn on, for example Castles, Leibfried, 
Lewis, Obinger & Pierson (2010), Saunders (2009), Uusitalo (1984) and Wilensky (1975). On 
such a basis, Gough developed a model of policymaking which identified five determinants of 
social policy. These were labelled the „5 I‟s‟:  
 Industrialisation: industrialisation, social structures, demography and development 
 Interests: collective actors, parties and power resources  
 Institutions: states, constitutions, democracy, political systems  
 Ideas: culture, ideologies and epistemic communities 
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 International influences: war, economic links and dependencies, international 
organisations and networks. 
 
Gough then considered the model‟s relevance to understanding social policy across 
the developing world and came to very different conclusions. In the words of Gough and 
Therborn (2010: p. 711):  
First, the developmental paths of European welfare states are not likely to be repeated. 
Second, an array of social programmes already exists in the global South, but they do 
not yet coalesce into an alternative „social policy model‟. Third, these programmes are 
likely to expand in favoured locations, but they will move forward along their own 
paths. 
 
Our first task in this article is to apply this approach to research on the financing of 
welfare systems. Does the „5 I‟s‟ model illuminate the structure and policies of tax states as 
well as the structure and policies of welfare states? And if so, can it do any better in 
understanding the financing regimes of the developing world? To answer these questions, we 
draw predominantly on the volume edited by Bräutigam, Fjeldstad and Moore (2008) where 
similar conceptual categories were deployed. We consider each in turn. 
 
Finance systems in developing countries 
Industrialisation and development: The association of greater proportionate tax revenues with 
higher levels of economic development is a robust finding across both time and space – a 
relationship first noticed by Adolf Wagner in the 19th century and named after him. „Official 
tax-collectors in richer countries, and especially in countries with a relatively small 
agricultural sector, succeed in capturing higher proportions of national income for the 
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government‟ (Moore, 2008: 40). However, there is still much variation in tax revenue 
unaccounted for by income per head, and the reasons for the relationship are disputed. 
Wagner himself, and several social policy scholars, explained it in terms of industrial society 
fostering new needs and demands for public services. Others credited the spread of the formal 
economy, which enables records to be kept and taxes to be collected in a more uniform and 
bureaucratic way (Ardant, 1975; Brewer, 1989). There is, in fact, no contradiction between 
these two explanations, which can be subsumed within a „modernisation‟ framework. 
Economic development, as well as expanding tax revenues, also brings with it a shift 
in the nature of taxation: „from levying taxes on specific items (salt, tobacco, carriages, 
individuals) to levying them according to accounting categories (income, sales, turnover 
valued-added, profits)‟ (Moore, 2008: 40). Moore claimed that in the developed world this 
was accompanied by a shift from coercion to contract in the tax relationship. Coercive 
taxation is characterised by arbitrary assessment, coercive collection and the absence of any 
representation for taxpayers in tax policy decisions. Contract taxation is characterised by 
„“revenue bargaining” – the exchange of tax revenues (for the state) for institutionalized 
influence over public policy (for citizens)‟ (Moore, 2008: 36). This is an idealised picture, 
even for advanced democratic countries, and certainly cannot be applied or assumed in the 
global South. Rather, interests and institutions, the second and third factors in our model, 
assume a powerful role in mediating the relationship between economic development and tax 
revenues. 
Interests: That the pattern of taxes normally reflects the interests of the powerful is 
perhaps too obvious a point to make, though it has rarely been subjected to scholarly 
investigation (Bräutigam, 2008). Similarly, the ability of taxes that are perceived to be unjust 
or coercive to foster tax rebellions is a part of the historical record, from the Roman Empire to 
the Poll Tax revolt against the Thatcher government in Britain. Thus, there is a complex link 
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between interest groups, perceived interests and the tax system. The direction of causality is 
difficult to disentangle. For example, there is an interesting debate over the extent to which 
undemocratic governments imposing tax hikes fosters demands for democratic reforms. Ross 
(2004) argued that if an undemocratic government raises the tax burden without a 
commensurate increase in desired services, then citizens tend to press for greater 
representation. Lieberman (2003) researched the ways that race and class determine 
bargaining power over taxes and public expenditures in Brazil and South Africa. He noted 
how a cross-class alliance among whites in South Africa fostered higher income tax levels 
and higher benefit levels (for whites) – a pattern we shall observe below.  
Institutions: The role of taxation in building states is a common theme among students 
of the state, before and after Schumpeter. For Levi (1988: p. ?), „The history of state revenue 
production is the history of the evolution of the state‟. Michael Mann‟s immense historical 
study of power emphasised the role of tax-raising powers (Mann, 1993: notably chapter 11). 
Bräutigam (2008: 1) wrote: „Taxation may play the central role in building and sustaining the 
power of states, and shaping their ties to society‟. Though theoretical explanations of this 
relationship differ, all agree that the administrative, fiscal and institutional capacity of 
governments to pursue public goals both engenders and reflects tax raising-powers. Here the 
parallels between institutional determinants of the welfare state and the tax state are very 
strong. 
Yet, more detailed studies of political institutions reveal different associations with tax 
levels. Gerring, Thacker and Moreno (2005) found that countries with „centripetal‟ 
constitutions, whose incentive for „voice‟ rather than „veto‟ (political systems that were 
unitary rather than federal, parliamentary rather than presidential, and list-proportional rather 
than first-past-the-post), could collect higher levels of taxes (cited in Bräutigam, 2008: 10–
11). Steinmo (1993) related the differences in tax systems between Sweden, the US and 
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Britain according to features of their constitutions, electoral rules etc. The extent of variability 
among global South states is likely to be greater still. 
Furthermore, the impact of democracy on tax revenues is disputed for developing 
countries. Fauvelle-Aymar (1999) found that autocracies have higher levels of taxation than 
democracies, whereas Thies (2004) found the opposite. This is similar to the contradictory 
findings on the links between democracy and the origins of social policies (Gough, 2008). 
 Ideas: The influence of culture, dominant ideas and policy learning also features in 
the literature on tax systems. For example, cultural values have an independent effect, as 
when public spiritedness or cultures of giving, such as zakat, foster a greater willingness to 
pay taxes. Tax compliance is affected by the perceived legitimacy of the government. This 
merges into a more instrumental account of tax compliance: „Countries with sizeable shadow 
economies or informal sectors have lower tax morale, as people in the formal sector can more 
easily observe large numbers of others escaping the tax net‟ (Alm & Torgler, 2004: p. ?). 
Levi‟s finding in some European countries that a belief in the welfare state makes people 
more willing to pay taxes, reminds us again of the close link between tax states and welfare 
states – if only in the most developed European welfare states (Levi, 1988 (not a quote, so no 
page number)). The emergence of „revenue bargaining‟ cements this link. However, the 
widespread acceptance of the need to pay taxes may rest on a prior „political settlement‟ 
between major interest groups, such as the broad „Keynesian‟ agreement between capital and 
labour in Western Europe after the Second World War. Dominant ideas will in part reflect 
dominant interests. 
International influences: The impact of war on the development of the European tax 
state is prominent and much researched. According to Tilly (1985), war made the modern 
state; it requires both administrative capacities and taxes. For this reason, preparation for war 
and war-fighting has also fostered popular demands for accountability and for parliaments to 
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represent the tax payers. Thies (2005) extended this argument to the existence of external 
threats to a state and also to internal threats from rival elites. Peacock and Wiseman‟s (1961) 
„plateau‟ effect then argued that war-time levels of taxation and spending will frequently 
persist into peacetime. 
Aside from war, international influence is the arena, claimed Moore (2008), where the 
past fiscal history of Europe and the OECD offers the fewest lessons to the developing world. 
Unlike the core OECD states, countries in the developing world today exist in a transformed 
international environment which profoundly reduces their dependence on domestic tax-payers 
for revenue. This is for four main reasons. First, many developing countries are in receipt of 
large non-tax revenues from natural resources which are in demand due to the emergence of a 
global economy. This provides these governments with natural resource rents and reduces 
their reliance on taxation (Hinojosa, Bebbington, Barrientos & Addison, 2010). Second, for 
many other poor countries, foreign aid from donors provides a second external revenue 
stream. Both of these large revenue streams „were not available to governments when the 
OECD countries were comparably poor‟ (Moore, 2008: 34). Many have argued that these 
streams create a „resource curse‟ and „aid dependency‟, respectively. In turn, they argue, this 
fosters patronage, waste and graft, and renders governments illegitimate, ineffective and 
unaccountable.  
Third, reliance on external revenues undermines the social contract and revenue 
bargaining and encourages middle-class exit into private and overseas welfare markets. 
„Unless the middle class is also catered for by state provision, good quality social provision 
can‟t be sustained‟ (Deacon, 2007: 172). But to bind in the middle classes, if not the elite, 
requires a willingness to pay taxes, which is undermined if taxation of mineral wealth, or aid 
or other grants from abroad weakens this social bond, or if private options are easily 
available. „The proposition is that the dependence of governments on broad taxation for 
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revenue is good for the quality of governance‟ (Moore, 2008: 34). Finally, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and other Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs) have played an 
unprecedented role in guiding and enforcing harsh fiscal policies in the developing world, 
with no parallel in the „emerging market economies‟ of the North in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. 
We can draw a mixed conclusion from this survey for the prospects for effective, 
sustainable and non-coercive taxes in the developing world. On the one hand, economic and 
political development is likely to foster less coercive taxation and greater revenues. „Coercive 
taxation is especially likely where ruling elites are unrestrained by their subjects…; 
economies are poor, rural, agrarian and subsistence‟ (Moore, 2008: 62). On the other hand, 
the absence of clearly represented interest groups and political settlements, the permeability of 
political institutions, the reliance on rents and aid, the intrusion of the IMF and the resultant 
„dependent learning‟ all undermine the development of effective governance via revenue 
bargaining and the ability to raise sustainable tax revenues.  
 
Welfare systems and fiscal systems  
How do these findings compare with those of the origins and development of welfare 
systems? What are the implications for the development of tax states and welfare states in the 
developing world? Again we consider the 5 I‟s in turn. 
First, the development and industrialisation explanation holds some truth: both tax and 
social spending shares are associated with levels of national income per head. This can be 
explained from both the spending side (to meet new „social needs‟ and demographic 
pressures) and the revenue side (the ability of states more effectively to levy taxes in 
emerging market economies). However, this relationship leaves much variation unexplained 
and is mediated by other factors. Furthermore, it is severely qualified in today‟s developing 
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world by several factors. First, the pervasive dualism of developing economies – the gulf 
between major cities and rural areas and the extensive spatial inequalities – is beyond 
comparison with Europe now and Europe a century ago. The role of families and households 
in attempting to mitigate risk and secure welfare is also far more extensive in the developing 
world than in the developed countries. Finally, the international economic environment is 
very different and in general less benign than the post-war period of Western welfare states. 
Second, the role of countervailing interests and „pressures from below‟ in shaping 
welfare and tax systems is more complex and indeterminate than the history of the West 
records. This is partly the result of the dualisms and fragmentation noted above. In addition, 
trade unions and labour-based political organisations have been squeezed between repression 
and deregulation, and are thus much weaker then their counterparts in post-war Western 
welfare states. Moreover, business and financial interests exert more structural and agency 
power. The ability of other collective „horizontal‟ sources of identity and mobilisation to 
substitute for this is unproven. None of this rules out an emerging collective interest in 
expanding rights-based welfare, but it makes it less likely. 
Third, the role of the welfare state and the tax state in European state-building has 
some parallels in developing countries with effective states, such as in East Asia. Here one 
might expect to see the parallel expansion of state social programmes, spending and taxation. 
However, in poorer world regions, the state-building process has been stalled by a variety of 
factors, including the intervention of powerful external actors. A welfare state must 
presuppose a minimal Weberian state. Similarly, „democracy‟ has an ambiguous effect on the 
tax-welfare state; the conflicting evidence points to an undetermined relationship mediated by 
other factors. 
Fourth, the cultural variety of the developing world exceeds that which is found within 
the homelands of the welfare state and its import is still not fully understood. Quite new ideas 
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supportive of an active state have emerged, notably that of the „developmental state‟ in Japan 
and East Asia, but this does not usually entail an extensive tax and welfare state. In much of 
the world, dualist economies and clientelist politics foster low tax morale and undermine 
willingness to pay taxes and use public services. Finally, the dominant ideology of neo-
liberalism has, over the past three decades, blocked indigenous welfarist ideas and imposed 
„dependent learning‟.  
Fifth, the global environment has utterly changed since the first industrial 
transformations in the 19th and the first three quarters of the 20th century. Here the ability of 
European history to offer any useful lessons is most severely tested. The developing world 
today is enmeshed in a network of economic relationships with powerful financial and 
corporate actors exerting structural power, is part of a world society of intergovernmental 
institutions with powers to constrain and sometimes control Southern governments, and is 
subject to ruling ideas and ideologies promulgated by powerful epistemic communities, 
including that of economists. Globalisation has provided in certain countries streams of rent 
and aid monies not available to Western countries in their modernisation phase, which can 
undermine the scope for domestic taxation and domestic welfare institutions. For the past 
three decades, the diverse domestic roads to the institution we now label „the welfare state‟ 
were replaced by a global one-size-fits-all road, mapped and laid down outside the countries 
concerned, though this neo-liberal model is now slowly breaking up.  
All these contrasts constrain the emergence of tax and social policies in the developing 
world – and the lessons which can be learned from the earlier histories in the West. To deal 
with this variety, complexity and under-determination, we go on to develop a distinctive 
conceptual framework and methodology in the remainder of this article. 
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Welfare and revenue regimes in the developing world: an empirical cluster 
analysis 
Welfare regime clusters 
One underlying lesson from European social policy is the importance of path dependency: 
how, once established, patterns or constellations of social policies tend to reproduce and are 
rather impervious to radical change, short of encountering a major crisis or external 
intervention. Esping-Andersen (1990) argued this most forcefully in his influential framework 
of welfare state regimes, which has received considerable empirical confirmation. Gough and 
Wood extended this framework to identify a wider range of „welfare‟ regimes (distinguished 
from welfare state regimes) across the developing world (Gough, 2004; Gough & Wood with 
et al., 2004; Wood & Gough, 2006). The regime concept rests on the idea that linear scoring 
approaches do not capture the systemic realities of country welfare or illfare systems:  
The linear scoring approach (more or less power, democracy, or spending) contradicts 
the sociological notion that power, democracy, or welfare are relationally structured 
phenomena … Welfare-state variations… are not linearly distributed, but clustered by 
regime types. (Esping-Anderson, 1990: 26). 
  
The appropriate method for testing this hypothesis, we argue, is cluster analysis. This 
is not a form of multivariate analysis, but a sophisticated descriptive technique for assigning a 
large number of observations into a smaller number of groups. In a recent article we used 
cluster analysis to map the welfare regimes of 65 non-OECD countries in 1990 and 2000 
(Abu Sharkh & Gough, 2010). Full details of the methodology, techniques and data sources 
are provided there and in Gough and Abu Sharkh (2010), but we summarise them here.   
We use two clustering techniques in sequence. We begin with dendograms generated 
by Hierarchical Cluster Analysis (HCA) and observe the number of major clusters these 
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identify. At the next stage, we turn to K-means Cluster Analysis (KCA), using the previous 
analysis to specify numbers of clusters in advance. Following numerous trials, we settle on 
ten clusters, of which two comprise single countries, leaving us with eight. In presenting our 
results, we go on to order the resulting clusters by comparing the distances between final 
cluster centres, generated by KCA, starting with the cluster that most resembles OECD 
welfare states, which we label A. Most remote from this cluster are clusters G and H. 
Our data sets exclude the OECD world: these rich countries are sufficiently distinct 
that their inclusion can diminish discrimination within the rest of the world. In order to avoid 
large numbers of smaller states, we also exclude countries with a population of less than 3 
million people. This left potentially 127 countries and a final tally of 65 countries with 
sufficient data. For the welfare regime analysis we sought data on four pairs of variables: 
government welfare spending (public spending on education and health as a share of GDP and 
social security contributions as a share of total government revenues); public service delivery 
(immunisation against measles and secondary school enrolment of females); the scale of 
external transfers (official aid and remittances from overseas migrants); and welfare outcomes 
(life expectancy at birth and the illiteracy rate of young people aged 15–24 years). 
Table 1 about here 
Table 1 presents our main findings. Countries in cluster A exhibit some characteristics 
of Western welfare states and may be labelled proto-welfare states. These countries share in 
common relatively extensive state commitments to welfare provision and relatively effective 
delivery of services plus moderately extensive social security programmes and superior 
welfare outcomes (by, it must be stressed, the standards of the non-OECD world). Apart from 
Israel and Costa Rica, this cluster comprises two distinct geographical zones and historical 
antecedents: the countries of the former Soviet Union and its bloc members, and the relatively 
industrialised countries of southern South America. Both developed European-style forms of 
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social protection policies in the middle of the 20th century, and both suffered degradation of 
these in the late 20th century through the external imposition of neo-liberal programmes.  
Cluster B exhibits the second-best level of welfare outcomes and social service 
outputs alongside low levels of state social spending (and low reliance on external flows of 
aid and remittances). This interesting combination suggests that security and illfare are 
mitigated by fast-growing average incomes and/or by other domestic, non-state informal 
institutions. This combination is found in three major world regions: (i) China and most 
countries in East Asia from Korea through Thailand to Sri Lanka (except Indonesia which 
dropped out of this cluster in 2000 having suffered most from the 1997 crisis); (ii) the 
remaining larger countries of South and Central America not in cluster A; and (iii) some 
countries in Western Asia (Iran, Turkey and Tajikistan). Countries in this group are mainly 
but not always low-middle income, with high growth rates, but are relatively undemocratic 
and unequal. They include some countries that have achieved historic reductions in poverty 
levels. One notable finding is that this cluster includes most countries of externally induced, 
reactive modernisation.  
Cluster C is mainly distinguished by great reliance on remittances from abroad which 
account for 9 per cent of gross national income on average and which constitute an informal 
functional alternative to public transfers. It comprises small countries in the Caribbean and 
Central America, plus Ecuador, Morocco and Sri Lanka. 
In southern and eastern Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
Kenya), a distinct cluster D exhibits relatively extensive public social policy (in both 
expenditures and outreach and literacy levels), but with poor health outcomes, due in large 
part to the HIV–AIDS pandemic.  
Cluster F, with at its core the countries of the Indian sub-continent – India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh and Nepal – exhibits high levels of illiteracy and low numbers of females in 
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secondary education. These are by no means „failed states‟: India is proclaimed as a future 
economic giant. Moreover, they boast a plethora of targeted social programmes and informal 
security mechanisms. However, the absence of effective schooling, health and social 
protection policies, coupled with highly gendered outcomes, according to such indicators as 
the population sex ratio, betokens high levels of insecurity among the mass of the population.  
Clusters G and H, mainly countries in sub-Saharan Africa, exhibit low and in some 
cases falling life expectancy alongside relatively weak states with low levels of public 
responsibility, indicated both by spending levels and social outputs, and higher dependence on 
overseas aid. The prevalence of poverty is also high and persistent.  
Thus, at the turn of the century, we find a highly variegated pattern of welfare and 
illfare systems across the global South. We conclude that different groups of countries in the 
developing world face divergent threats to human wellbeing and divergent potentials for 
social policies to mitigate these. In Central and parts of Eastern Europe and parts of South 
America, despite serious erosion of their post-war welfare systems, we see a potential for new 
forms of social citizenship. In much of East and Southeast Asia, much of Latin America, Iran, 
Turkey and possibly other parts of the MENA region, we find distinctive, different yet 
moderately effective informal welfare systems alongside small state sectors. In the Indian 
subcontinent, there is a plethora of formal and informal programmes, but with little realisation 
in terms of spending, delivery or welfare outcomes. In much of sub-Saharan Africa, what 
social programmes there are have been eroded and submerged beneath a rising tide of human 
need; this remains a zone of high insecurity and illfare. 
  
Revenue structures: a cluster analysis 
The relative size of total government revenues as a share of Gross Domestic product (GDP) 
has changed very little over the past decade and a half, taking the developing world as a 
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whole. But there exists tremendous heterogeneity of tax and revenue levels, even within the 
usual categories of countries, such as region or income level or dependence on oil and 
minerals. Again, to grasp this heterogeneity, we use the same two-stage cluster analysis. 
We distinguish the following major categories of government revenues: Total 
government revenue = taxes + social security contributions + other government revenues 
(notably oil and mineral rents) + aid and grants from IGOs and foreign governments. 
To begin with, we undertake a cluster analysis of the four government revenues in the 
identity above, the results of which are presented in Table 2. The full outputs for this 
clustering are shown in Gough and Abu Sharkh (2010). The analysis identifies four clusters of 
countries where one form of revenue is dominant, and a fifth where this is not the case.  
Table 2 about here 
This reveals the following. First, countries with relatively high levels of social security 
contributions are geographically clustered among the ex-communist countries in Eastern 
Europe and the ex-Soviet Union: all are in this cluster except for Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. 
In addition there are three countries in Latin America – Uruguay, Brazil and Costa Rica – 
with relatively extensive social security contributions, which thereby stand apart from the rest 
of the continent. 
Second, the cluster with substantial tax revenues is unexpectedly limited to just two 
world regions: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and southern and eastern Africa. 
Of the countries for which we have data, every MENA country is in this group except Yemen 
and Iran, and every country in southern and eastern Africa except Botswana. (In all these 
three other cases, „other revenues‟ dominate.)  
Third, three of the four countries in the small country cluster defined by high reliance 
on „other revenues‟ appear in the list of mineral rich countries of Hinojosa et al. (2008); their 
export dependence ratios are Yemen (94%), Botswana (87%) and Iran (83%) 
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Fourth, a greater relative reliance on overseas aid is mainly a feature of central and 
western sub-Saharan Africa; six of the nine countries in this region for which we have data 
fall into this cluster.  
Lastly, the largest cluster comprises countries with no dominant source of government 
revenue. This includes all countries in East Asia and South Asia and the bulk of countries in 
Latin America. This is clearly a very heterogeneous group of countries, requiring further 
disaggregation (see below). 
  
Welfare regimes and revenue structures 
How do the welfare regime clusters map onto the new data on revenue structures presented 
above? To answer this, we first present the mean level of tax and revenue shares for each 
country grouped according to our welfare regime clusters in Table 3. Table 4 summarises the 
mean values for the clusters together with their standard deviations (s.d.). Further detail 
including box plots is provided in Abu Sharkh and Gough (2010). We summarise these 
beginning with the broadest category – total state revenues – and then break this down in the 
constituent revenue streams.  
Tables 3 & 4 about here 
Total state revenues: This includes all revenue sources embracing aid, revenues from 
oil and minerals, all forms of taxes etc. There is a clear distinction here between welfare 
regimes A and D and all other countries. The proto-welfare states of cluster A are associated 
with greater government revenues, between 25 and 35 per cent of GDP, as would be expected. 
Israel and Croatia are outliers with revenues over 40 per cent of GDP, and Argentina is an 
outlier with 14 per cent GDP. But the anomalous high-spending/low-security regime D in 
southern Africa also records high revenues, with Botswana showing revenues equal to 45 per 
cent GDP. 
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Regime B records considerably lower revenue shares, averaging 18 per cent GDP 
(with China a notable outlier with 7% GDP). The average is similar to that of regime E, 
comprising Indonesia and four countries in central Africa. The lowest revenue shares are 
found in regime F centred on the Indian sub-continent – but the three percentage-point 
difference between it and regime B is small compared with the wide differences in welfare 
outcomes.  
Government tax revenues: Focussing solely on governments‟ abilities to raise tax 
revenues if anything diminishes the distinctiveness of our welfare regime clusters, with one 
exception: regime D now records by far the highest mean tax share, exceeding the tax take of 
regime A countries by six percentage points. The proto-welfare states in cluster A record the 
second highest mean tax share of 17 per cent GDP, with Israel and Croatia again featuring as 
high tax outliers.  
However, there is a considerable overlap in tax takes between cluster A and clusters B 
and C. In cluster B, there is considerable variation, with Turkey (20% GDP), Chile (17%) and 
Korea (16%) recording tax revenues higher than many in cluster A: the Gough–Wood label of 
„informal security regime‟ does not do full justice to such countries. At the other extreme, 
China records a remarkably low tax take of 7 per cent GDP. Regimes E, F and H exhibit tax 
levels lower or equal to those in B, with considerable overlap. Thus, whatever it is that 
explains the superior welfare outcomes in cluster B, it is not their tax shares (though of course 
the absolute amounts of tax raised per head are higher). 
Income tax revenues: When we narrow our focus further to revenues from income tax 
the mean levels of all the welfare regime clusters from A to F reveal remarkably few 
differences (ranging between 3 and 5% GDP), apart from cluster D, where income taxation 
averages 10 per cent of GDP. However, the standard deviations are everywhere high, 
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suggesting that factors other than government income tax capacity are critical in 
discriminating between our welfare regimes (as we would expect). 
Social security contributions: When we turn to revenues from social security 
contributions, the proto-welfare states of cluster A stand out with the average share exceeding 
8 per cent of GDP. In all other regimes, their share is trivial. Here, there is a clear link 
between welfare regime characteristics and one particular revenue source, as theories of 
welfare state financing would predict. 
State mineral revenues: Finally, Table 3 also picks out those countries that are 
dependent on oil and mineral revenues. Simply eye-balling the table reveals little pattern; 
countries with high mineral revenues are scattered across every welfare regime except for 
cluster A. The fact that none of the proto-welfare states are heavily mineral-dependent is 
worthy of further investigation. But outside this cluster there is no clear evidence of either a 
„resource curse‟ or a resource bonanza effect on welfare systems and welfare outcomes. 
 
Conclusions and cautions 
The literature review suggests that the „5 I‟s‟ explanatory model of welfare states in the West 
also applies to the development of Western tax states and fiscal systems. However, it has less 
purchase in understanding welfare and revenue systems in the developing world. In the global 
South, the pattern of industrialisation, interest formation and representation, institutional 
development, ideational influences and the entire international environment are very different: 
more complex, variegated and heterogeneous. Consequently, their ability to explain welfare 
and revenue systems is more indeterminate. 
This report recognises this heterogeneity by using cluster analysis to identify patterns 
in welfare regimes and revenue systems across the developing world. It has analysed data for 
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65 non-OECD countries (excluding micro-states) for the year 2000, covering welfare regimes, 
revenue structures and the relationship between the two. 
The hypothesis that higher tax levels would be associated with greater state 
effectiveness in meeting welfare/security needs is not clearly borne out by this cluster 
analysis. It is only the scope of social security contributions that appears to correlate with 
proto-welfare states in the developing world. Here, there is evidence of a link between a 
specific revenue source and proto-welfare state regimes. Moreover, this cluster relies very 
little on revenues from minerals and oil. Apart from Israel and Costa Rica, this cluster 
comprises two distinct geographical zones and historical antecedents: the countries of the 
former Soviet Union and its bloc members, and the relatively industrialised countries of 
southern South America.  
The fast-developing countries of East Asia and some other middle-income countries in 
Latin America and the MENA region present an interesting anomalous picture in 2000. They 
exhibit relatively low shares of government revenue, taxes, income taxes and social security 
contributions, yet record relatively good social outputs and welfare outcomes. This suggests 
that security and illfare are mitigated by fast-growing average incomes and/or by other 
domestic, non-state informal institutions. A notable finding is that this cluster includes most 
countries of externally induced, reactive modernisation (Therborn‟s fourth route to 
modernity), where states have been forced over longer periods to adjust to outside 
developmental pressures (Therborn, 1992). This may indicate the presence of „developmental 
states‟ with considerable infrastructure and steering capacity, but which have not prioritised 
traditional social policies. Here, one might expect to see new forms of collective management 
of risk emerge. Indeed, this can already be seen in some of the outliers in this group, such as 
Korea and Chile (and China). 
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In contrast to this pattern, we observe a small group of countries in southern–eastern 
Africa with high spending and high tax revenues, but with poor welfare outcomes. This 
combination partly reflects the damaging effects of AIDS over the previous decade, but not 
entirely. Other world regions display low tax and expenditure levels, poor or ineffective social 
outputs and low welfare outcomes. In the case of much of sub-Saharan Africa, this partly 
reflects the impact of the HIV–AIDS pandemic; further analysis of poverty outcomes is 
required to assess whether this is the major explanation. In the case of India and South Asia, 
wide gender differences and poor literacy rates are coupled with ineffective social 
programmes, notwithstanding high rates of economic growth. 
Finally, in interpreting these findings, several caveats and limitations should be borne 
in mind. Data available for a large number of countries are rarely capable of catching the 
detail we require to map either welfare regimes or state revenue systems. Our expenditure, 
output and outcome measures all centre on health and education; there are as of yet no 
reliable, regularly collected data on social protection expenditures across the developing 
world, let alone more subtle measures of mandation and tax expenditures. For example, social 
protection systems need not entail heavy state expenditures or revenues; they can be 
mandated by governments but administered privately, and the mandated contributions of 
employers and employees may not figure as government revenues. Countries like Chile and 
Korea with such programmes are not picked up and therefore appear in the low-spending 
cluster B. Nor will social protection necessarily be picked up by social insurance 
contributions – there has been a trend in recent years to expand social assistance and 
conditional cash transfers (CCTs). Again, we cannot even monitor regularised market 
provision across the world, enabling us to distinguish non-mandatory private insurance and 
out-of-pocket payments. The paucity of international data on social protection and welfare 
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programmes is remarkable. Finally, the data we have used all refer to the year 2000: many 
new and expanded social programmes have emerged since then which do not figure here. 
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